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DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW 
THE POSSIBILITY OF ILLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 
Mark Tushnet* 
Abstract 
This Essay examines the possibility of an illiberal constitutionalism 
in which some citizens have “second-class” status – protected against 
arbitrary government action but with restricted rights. Drawing on 
scholarship dealing with “dual states” and federalism, the Essay 
argues that illiberal constitutionalism is possible conceptually but may 
be quite difficult to sustain over time in the face of the openness of even 
illiberal polities to demographic and similar changes. 
The revival of interest in comparative constitutional law over the 
past generation or so was provoked in substantial part by the transition 
from authoritarian rule to liberal constitutionalism in Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe, and South Africa.1 This shift may have 
dichotomized the conceptual space for comparison between liberal 
constitutionalism and authoritarianism. Even the proliferating literature 
on “adjectival constitutionalism” seems to deal mostly with varieties of 
liberal constitutionalism.2 In recent work, studies of abusive 
constitutionalism deal with the use of the forms made available within 
liberal constitutions that enable a transition from liberal 
constitutionalism (back to) authoritarianism.3 
This Essay begins an exploration of an alternative to both liberal 
constitutionalism and authoritarianism, in an attempt to discover 
whether we can expand the conceptual space for comparative 
                                                                                                                     
 * William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. An earlier version 
of this Essay was presented as the Dunwody Lecture at the University of Florida Levin College 
of Law. I thank the Florida Law Review for inviting me to deliver the lecture, and Brian Bix, Jill 
Goldenpine, Madhav Khosla, David Law, Gila Stopler, and Gerald Torres for comments on a 
draft of this Essay. An oral comment by Dieter Grimm reinforced their observation that the 
category of illiberal constitutionalism had to be defined in a way that distinguished it from the 
rule of law, and this version attempts to do so. This Essay is my first effort in a larger project 
examining the possibility of illiberal constitutionalism. A subsequent Essay will address 
moderately theocratic constitutional systems. 
 1. Cf. David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the 
Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 46 (2011) (referring to the events of 1989 as influencing the 
revival of interest in comparative constitutional law). 
 2. Mark Tushnet, Editorial, Varieties of Constitutionalism, 14 INT’L J. CON. L. 1, 1 
(2016). 
 3. David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013); see 
also David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 870–71 
(2013). 
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constitutionalism.4 It does not take the position that illiberal 
constitutionalism, were it possible, would be normatively attractive, but 
only that there might be systems worth studying that are 
constitutionalist but not liberal.5 This Essay begins with several 
observations about the project, all of which have the effect of 
emphasizing the question mark in the Essay’s title—that is, it may be 
that the conceptual space actually can only be dichotomized into liberal 
constitutionalism and authoritarianism, with no possibility of illiberal 
constitutionalism.6 
First, what is liberal constitutionalism? For the purpose of this 
Essay, it refers to a set of political principles with two components.7 
Liberalism assumes the equality of all people—or, for present purposes, 
the equality of all citizens.8 In addition, it assumes, in political 
                                                                                                                     
 4. There is a literature on illiberal democracy, which deals with polities in which voters 
freely choose policies that are inconsistent with liberal commitments along some dimensions. 
See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 1, 1997), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy. That literature is 
relevant to this inquiry, but only indirectly, because illiberal democracies generate illiberal 
outcomes without taking illiberal principles as a foundation of their constitutionalism. Put 
another way, critics of an illiberal policy generated in an illiberal democracy can point to 
principles embedded in the nation’s constitution as the basis for arguing that the policies are 
unconstitutional. Such arguments would be unavailable in illiberal constitutional systems, 
because the illiberal principles are themselves embedded in the constitution. In an earlier work, I 
examined what I called “authoritarian constitutionalism,” which at the time of writing I 
considered a system committed to principles like free and fair elections and freedom of 
expression, but with sufficient restrictions on the implementation of those principles to place 
them near the low end of the range of liberal constitutionalism. See Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian 
Constitutionalism, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 393, 396 (2015). On the idea of a range of liberal 
constitutionalism, see infra text accompanying notes 7–10. 
 5. This Essay uses stylized examples rather than real-world ones to define the conceptual 
terrain. It should be noted that some national constitutions may approach illiberalism; these 
include Hungary and (controversially) Israel. 
 6. The difficulty in even figuring out what illiberal constitutionalism might look like 
suggests that it might in fact not be possible. 
 7. I suspect that on further reflection I will conclude that the two components are 
actually versions of a single principle. For example, political philosopher Charles Taylor 
describes illiberalism as the majority saying to the minority, “Your view is not as valuable, in 
the eyes of this polity, as that of your more numerous compatriots.” CHARLES TAYLOR, 
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 57 (1994) (emphasis added). 
Here, the minority is not equal, and it is not equal because of the priority the polity gives to a 
specific view of the good. Id. 
 8. Restricting the component to “citizens” raises questions about the principles of 
immigration policy a liberal polity must adhere to. This Essay is not the place for a full 
discussion, but it appears that most liberal constitutionalists adhere to the view, associated with 
Professor Joseph Carens, that liberalism in principle requires open borders, and that that 
requirement can be compromised for contingent, mostly political reasons, such as the risk that 
open borders will flood social welfare states with immigrants, and concern that too-rapid rates 
of immigration and the sometimes-associated cultural change will disrupt the stability of the 
nation’s commitment to liberalism. For overviews, see generally JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS 
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philosopher John Rawls’s terms, the priority of the right over the good, 
ruling out the possibility that a liberal state could be committed to more 
types of perfectionism.9 This Essay focuses on the first component. The 
illiberal polities this Essay will discuss reject the equality premise, 
where “equality” refers to something like “equality with respect to 
aspects of being a person that are relevant to governance.”10 
Second, what is constitutionalism? Sometimes one runs across 
relatively “thick” definitions of constitutionalism. Such definitions build 
liberalism into the definition: A system is a constitutional one only if it 
robustly protects civil liberties such as freedom of expression, for 
example. Such a definition of constitutionalism would rule out the 
possibility of illiberal constitutionalism at the outset. For some 
purposes, of course, doing so is perfectly sensible, but this Essay cannot 
do so (if it did, it would end here). 
There is another difficulty with equating constitutionalism with 
liberal constitutionalism. Consider the following polities: the United 
States before the adoption of the Nineteenth (women’s suffrage) 
Amendment, the United States between the end of the Civil War and the 
civil rights era of the twentieth century, and the United States today. 
Should those polities be considered non-liberal because (in order) 
women lacked the right to vote, African-Americans were effectively 
denied the right to vote, and African-Americans are denied civic 
equality along many dimensions? If we do consider them non-liberal, 
liberal constitutionalism becomes something like an aspiration or a 
goal—again, a perfectly acceptable account for some purposes, but not 
helpful in assessing whether real polities are liberal constitutionalist 
ones or not.11 Perhaps, though, one could contrast aspirational liberal 
constitutionalism with illiberal constitutionalism by showing that 
illiberal constitutionalism abandons one or more of the aspirations of 
liberal constitutionalism; perhaps the inquiry this Essay pursues might 
be understood in those terms. 
Without liberalism built into the definition of constitutionalism, this 
Essay’s inquiry requires some independent definition of 
                                                                                                                     
OF IMMIGRATION (2013) (discussing the practical problems immigration poses on Western 
democracies); Rainer Bauböck, Migration and Citizenship: Normative Debates, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 594–613 (Marc R. Rosenblum & 
Daniel J. Tichenor eds., 2012). Related but somewhat different questions arise in connection 
with long-term resident noncitizens, and in particular guest workers. Again, those questions are 
outside the scope of this Essay, but I hope to say something about them in the larger project. 
 9. John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 
252 (1988).  
 10. This is the meaning of the principle in the Declaration of Independence, that “all men 
are created equal.” 
 11. It might be helpful if supplemented by some metric by which one could assess the 
degree to which polities fell short of the aspiration to “full” liberal constitutionalism. 
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constitutionalism. At present, and pending further reflection, this Essay 
defines constitutionalism as requiring, first, that government officials 
not act arbitrarily; or, seen from the other side, constitutionalism 
requires that officials act pursuant to some general principle. Again, this 
must be qualified. No system can guarantee complete compliance with 
its regulative principles, so no matter what sometimes officials will act 
arbitrarily. We need some idea of what I have elsewhere called 
“shortfalls,” failures of compliance that are sufficiently isolated or 
infrequent that they do not undermine the claim that the system is 
constitutionalist.12 In addition, a shortfall exists when a system fails to 
live up to its aspirations—fails fully to implement a policy that it 
acknowledges as normatively valuable. Rejection of one or more liberal 
rights in principle is not a shortfall.13 
Legal philosopher Lon Fuller famously offered an extremely thin 
definition of the rule of law, as requiring eight attributes: generality, 
publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, and practicability, with 
some degree of stability over time and with relatively few shortfalls.14 If 
we define constitutionalism as no more than non-arbitrariness, it may be 
no different from the “mere” rule of law.  
Beyond the “mere” rule of law, constitutionalism may require what 
this Essay calls “thin” constitutionalism. Such a constitutionalism 
preserves some space for civil society and, concomitantly, offers some 
protection to expression. Further, government decisions are rooted in a 
process that is in some sense consultative, whether through elections or 
other methods of ascertaining the public’s preferences. In that sense, 
thin constitutionalism rests on the consent of the people. 
                                                                                                                     
 12. For the language of shortfalls, see ANTONI ABAT I NINET & MARK TUSHNET, THE 
ARAB SPRING: AN ESSAY ON REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 15 (2015). 
 13. Can shortfalls within a constitutionalist system be systematic, for example, 
concentrated on a distinct subpopulation in the country? The answer is likely “no”: A nation 
with systematic arbitrariness as to a subpopulation is either an illiberal constitutional nation or 
an authoritarian one. 
 14. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–38 (1969). Some, and perhaps Fuller 
himself, believe that a system that satisfies Fuller’s eight criteria will (almost) inevitably satisfy 
thicker requirements associated with liberalism. 
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Finally, what is the possibility of illiberal constitutionalism? My 
observation that liberal constitutionalism might be an aspirational ideal 
suggests that illiberal constitutionalism is similarly aspirational, though 
of course in the other direction. And, as this Essay’s treatment of 
aspirational liberal constitutionalism suggests, there should be some 
real-world––rather than purely conceptual––ways of identifying these 
systems. And, in the real world, illiberal constitutionalism may be 
possible if illiberal systems persist or are relatively stable over some 
reasonable period, a period comparable to the length of time over which 
liberal constitutional systems persist or are relatively stable.15 
With all these preliminaries out of the way, I offer a sketch of a 
polity in which illiberalism might be sensible and non-arbitrary. 
Consider a polity with several ethnic or religious groups. One group 
has, say, fifty-five percent of the population, another twenty-five 
percent, and the third twenty percent; the second group holds a slight 
majority of the nation’s wealth, and the third has strong ties with a 
relatively wealthy diaspora. These groups have frequently been in 
violent conflict. For contingent historical reasons, the three groups 
cannot separate into distinct nations; they must somehow exist within a 
single polity. Realizing that achieving civil peace is a great value,16 they 
agree to a constitution dividing power among them. The peace pact they 
reach shares political power equally among all three groups, the hope 
being that the two minority groups’ access to different sources of wealth 
will bring material prosperity. The national constitution dividing power 
is illiberal because not all citizens are treated equally with respect to 
political power: A vote cast by a member of the majority group counts 
less than a vote cast by a member of either minority group. On the face 
of things, this is not an obviously unattractive arrangement.17 
This Essay leaves this possibility aside for now, returning to it at the 
conclusion, and turns to a substantially less attractive example: a polity 
in which ethnonationalism is constitutive. Suppose, then, that Hungary 
defines itself in its constitution as a nation for people of Hungarian 
ethnicity. Those of other ethnicities—such as Polish or Romany—are 
                                                                                                                     
 15. The period for liberal constitutionalism is almost certainly longer than the well-known 
“nineteen years” as the average duration of national constitutions, because that figure includes 
the large number of cases in which one liberal constitution replaces a prior liberal constitution. 
For the figure, see ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 2 
(2009). 
 16. That realization underlies the Hobbesian–Lockean account of liberal 
constitutionalism. See Steven Forde, John Locke and the Natural Law and Natural Rights 
Tradition, NAT. L., NAT. RTS., & AM. CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011), http://www.nlnrac.org/ 
earlymodern/locke. 
 17. For a discussion of whether the arrangement can be stable, see infra pp. 1381–82. 
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second-class citizens of Hungary. Can such a polity be constitutionalist 
even though it is illiberal in denying the equality of all citizens?18 
This Essay approaches that question from two directions: from 
underneath, so to speak, by examining how some obviously illiberal 
systems deal with the existence of second-class citizenship in a non-
constitutionalist way, and then from above, using federalism as a way of 
thinking about the possibility of systemic unequal treatment.   
The émigré scholar Ernst Fraenkel described Nazi Germany as a 
“dual state.”19 He observed that large swathes of law were administered 
in a straightforward way, completely compliant with the requirements 
of the rule of law. For example, disputes over ordinary commercial 
contracts between “Aryan” Germans or property disputes among them 
were handled by the courts in a way indistinguishable from how they 
had dealt with similar disputes in the years before the Nazis took power. 
But, he also noted, there was another “legal” system, dealing with 
disputes involving Jews and other non-Aryans. In that—the “dual”—
system, the stated legal rules, those satisfying the rule of law, went out 
the window. So, for example, in a commercial dispute between an 
Aryan and a Jew, the court would utterly disregard the clear language of 
a contract provision if that language pointed to a legal victory of the Jew 
and find in favor of the Aryan. The outcomes were arbitrary from the 
point of view of the rule of law, though of course they were completely 
predictable. 
In a dual state, we find first- and second-class citizens, with the 
dividing line drawn by ethnonationalism. Aryans in Nazi Germany and 
whites in apartheid South Africa were first-class citizens, entitled to the 
full complement of liberal rights and the other attributes of liberal 
constitutionalism, including, importantly, freedom of speech and 
freedom of movement.20 In contrast, the second-class citizens—non-
Aryans in Germany and what were known as coloureds in South 
                                                                                                                     
 18. This Essay puts to one side systems like the Ottoman one in which citizens are subject 
to different rules of personal law (especially family law) depending on their religious affiliation 
or ethnicity. Problems of boundary drawing do arise in such systems as a result of intermarriage 
and other forms of what this Essay describes as porosity, but the limited domain of the special 
rules distinguishes them from the systems of interest in this Essay. 
 19. ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF 
DICTATORSHIP 46 (1941). Fraenkel’s analysis was later applied to apartheid South Africa by 
sociologist Pierre van den Berghe, PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 101 (1967) (describing “herrenvolk democracy”), and political 
scientist Jens Meierhenrich, JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN 
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652–2000 (2008). 
 20. MEIERHENRICH, supra note 19, at 1652–2000. As the Essay discusses below in 
connection with federalism, issues can arise about the content of specific liberal freedoms, but 
the key is that first-class citizens enjoy rights specified in ways that keep the specifications 
within the range available in liberalism. 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 6 [], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss6/1
2017] THE POSSIBILITY OF ILLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? 1373 
 
Africa—were subject to purely arbitrary governance. The dual state 
described by Fraenkel is illiberal but not constitutionalist because the 
second-class citizens are subject to arbitrary governance because the 
law as applied has no relation to the stated law. 
For my purposes, then, I modify the concept to investigate a (quasi) 
dual state in which the first-class citizens get full liberal 
constitutionalism, and in particular rather robust freedoms, and the 
second-class citizens get rule-of-law and thin constitutionalism. 
Consider a stylized account of contemporary Hungary, which is at least 
moving in the direction of ethnonationalism. Assume that ethnic 
Hungarians are the first-class citizens, and Hungarians of Polish ethnic 
origin are the second-class citizens. A Hungarian of Polish ethnicity is 
the tenant of an ethnic Hungarian, and they get into an ordinary 
landlord–tenant dispute. The existing law favors the tenant on a 
dispositive issue. The dispute is resolved favorably to the tenant. But, 
immediately, the government modifies landlord–tenant law on the issue. 
The new law does not single out Hungarians of Polish ethnicity for 
special treatment, for that would be incompatible with the rule of law. 
Rather, the new law’s provisions, while facially neutral as to ethnicity, 
have, and are known to have, a substantially disproportionate adverse 
impact on tenants of Polish ethnicity without having a similar impact on 
ethnic Hungarian tenants. Or, the new law leaves room for executive 
and judicial discretion in enforcement and interpretation, which will 
predictability be exercised against the disfavored group.21 Hungary, on 
this account—again, quite stylized—is a quasi-dual state in which 
ethnic Hungarians get liberal constitutionalism and Hungarians of 
Polish ethnicity get rule-of-law constitutionalism. On these definitions, 
Hungary is an illiberal constitutionalist state. 
But, of course, this is a stylized and therefore imaginary state. Could 
it be realized in practice? In practice, a quasi-dual state may well run 
into serious problems of stability, of movement from a quasi-dual state 
to a true dual state and so from illiberal constitutionalism to illiberalism 
without constitutionalism.22 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Thanks to Professor Brian Bix for suggesting this formulation. 
 22. There might be difficulties of implementation as well. For example, in the example of 
the landlord–tenant dispute developed in the text, will it be possible for the government’s 
lawyers to devise new provisions in the law of tenancy that have the necessary disparate effect? 
Implementation difficulties of this sort could be overcome by talented (though of course a- or 
immoral) lawyers, at least often enough to keep the system within the bounds of 
constitutionalism. There may be other kinds of implementation difficulties that “good” 
lawyering cannot overcome. And, perhaps an illiberal constitutionalist regime will be unable to 
recruit enough “good” lawyers to keep it from degenerating into a non-constitutionalist one. 
Roughly, the thought is, the regime will find itself saying, in effect, that it is too difficult to 
sustain constitutionalism so it might as well abandon constitutionalism and become a true dual 
state. 
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Consider initially the second-class citizens. One can imagine that 
they would not be a source of a substantial threat to the regime’s 
stability. They might be substantially outnumbered, so that political 
resistance is, so to speak, futile, and they might lack access to the 
resources needed to mount a successful campaign of violent resistance. 
Further, the benefits they receive from rule-of-law and thin 
constitutionalism, and in particular the regularity accompanying the rule 
of law, may be enough to suppress high levels of resistance by the 
second-class citizens. They might resign themselves to a world in which 
they are badly treated if the bad treatment is predictable.23 
Next, what of the first-class citizens? They might benefit materially 
and psychologically from the system, but some of them might want to 
use their liberal freedoms in ways that could lead to instability. 
Consider freedom of speech. Some first-class citizens may want to use 
that freedom to agitate for the elimination of the quasi-dual state and 
illiberal constitutionalism and for replacing it with liberal 
constitutionalism. The abstract right of free expression can be specified, 
within liberalism, in ways that give the government some resources to 
deploy against these agitators. For example, for long periods it was 
thought compatible with a liberal idea of free expression for the 
government to be authorized to punish speech that had a tendency to 
lead to social disorder.24 And, even under more stringent verbal tests 
social circumstances might be such that an illiberal quasi-dual state 
could plausibly claim, for example, that agitation for the elimination of 
second-class citizenship was, under prevailing social conditions, highly 
likely to lead to serious violence in the short run—that is, that the 
government could show that it could indeed satisfy an only slightly 
modified version of a test requiring “imminent lawless action.”25 At 
some point, though, the regime might have to deploy illiberal forms of 
suppression, including violence and departures from the rule of law, 
against first-class citizen dissidents to cut off a threat to its persistence. 
                                                                                                                     
 23. There are many accounts of adaptations of this type by African-Americans to the 
American system of apartheid—segregation by law—particularly in connection with what might 
be called the routine activities of daily life such as shopping and transportation. As suggested 
earlier, though, it might well be that that system was illiberal and nonconstitutionalist because 
arbitrary treatment of African-Americans was so pervasive as to dominate the domains in which 
African-Americans were subject to rule-of-law constitutionalism. 
 24. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (using the language of 
“clear and present danger” but applying it in a way that makes clear that the test actually is one 
of “tendency”). 
 25. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The watering-down occurs by 
eliminating the requirement that the agitator’s words be words of incitement. But, scholars have 
raised important questions about the coherence of that requirement in circumstances where 
seemingly innocuous words have the effect of incitement. See, e.g., G. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 19 (2d ed. 2003). 
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At that point, again illiberal constitutionalism would become 
illiberalism without constitutionalism.26 
Another implementation problem for the quasi-dual state’s stability 
arises from difficulties in maintaining the boundary between the first-
class and the second-class citizens. That boundary can be physical, as in 
segregation and apartheid, and conceptual, in the identification of who 
exactly is a first-class citizen. 
As political philosopher Charles Taylor puts it, liberal polities are 
“porous.”27 Specifically, people move into them and have relations 
outside them. What could the illiberal constitutionalism regime do in the 
face of porosity, and in particular in the face of movements by the first-
class citizens “outside” their privileged position? Geographic separation 
can help maintain stability, but it poses its own problems, in particular, 
by reducing the costs of organizing resistance within the community of 
second-class citizens. And, often, the first-class citizens will either need 
or find it convenient to employ the second-class citizens; think here of 
an analogy to the “guest workers” in many nations.28 In these and other 
settings, the first- and second-class citizens will have social interactions. 
Some of these interactions will reinforce the division, but some might 
undermine it. The facts of Loving v. Virginia29 are illustrative.30 Richard 
Loving, a white construction worker, and Mildred Jeter, a woman of 
African-American and Native American descent, grew up in a small 
town in Virginia during the segregation era.31 They met and fell in 
love.32 They married in nearby Washington, D.C., then returned to 
Virginia, where they were arrested for violating that state’s law against 
racial intermarriage.33 These facts show how porosity interacts with the 
line between first- and second-class citizens. And, more important for 
present purposes, they show how efforts to maintain the line between 
first- and second-class citizenship lead to restrictions on the liberal 
constitutional rights of the first-class citizens, here the right to choose 
who one marries.  
                                                                                                                     
 26. The South African example suggests that all of what I have written about the quasi-
dual state might be true of Fraenkel’s dual state as well. The pure dual state can maintain control 
of the second-class citizens through terroristic repressions, but some first-class citizens might 
reject that policy, and the dual state might be able to meet the threat they pose by depriving them 
of some of their liberal constitutional rights. 
 27. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 63. 
 28. Typically guest workers are non-citizens, but the practice does include some workers 
who are or become citizens.  
 29. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 30. Id. at 2–7.  
 31. Richard Loving, BIOGRAPHY.COM, https://www.biography.com/people/richard-loving-
110716 (last updated Nov. 10, 2016).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2–3.  
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These facts illustrate a more general difficulty with an illiberal 
constitutionalism dividing the citizenry into one group with full liberal 
rights and another with mere rule-of-law and thin constitutional 
protections: Maintaining the boundary between the two classes will 
require that the first-class citizens surrender some of their liberal 
constitutional rights.34 Perhaps, though, we might still treat the system 
as one of illiberal constitutionalism because the first-class citizens, 
though they do not enjoy the full panoply of liberal constitutional rights, 
enjoy enough of those rights. They are not subject to the systematic 
arbitrariness that makes a system non-constitutionalist, and they have 
enough liberal rights to make the system different from one in which 
everyone is subject only to rule-of-law constitutionalism. 
Porosity leads to another difficulty for the type of illiberal 
constitutionalism under consideration. The system must be able to sort 
people into the two categories of first- and second-class citizens. So, for 
example, in the stylized example of Hungary, one has to know who 
counts as an ethnic Hungarian. Consider a person whose grandparents 
were concededly ethnic Hungarians but whose mother married an ethnic 
Serb or Pole or German. Is such a person an ethnic Hungarian, and 
therefore a first-class citizen, or not? The categories’ existence requires 
something like Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg Laws.35 And, as those laws 
show, the definitional features in rules allocating people to the two 
categories will inevitably have important arbitrary features: Suppose 
that, like the Nuremberg Laws, the (imagined) Hungarian laws define 
ethnic Hungarians as those with four ethnic Hungarian grandparents. 
That definition seems quite arbitrary when applied to a person with 
three ethnic Hungarian grandparents and one Serbian one, who has 
always lived as an ethnic Hungarian, or to a person with one ethnic 
Hungarian parent and one Serbian parent who is fully assimilated into 
the ethnic Hungarian community. In short, there is arbitrariness at the 
heart of the illiberal regime—in the very definitions on which the 
system rests––and that arbitrariness undermines its claim to be 
constitutionalist. 
So, although one can imagine an illiberal constitutionalism as a 
modified dual state, in which there are permanent second-class citizens 
who receive rule-of-law constitutionalism, there appear to be good 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Nor will it be possible for the system’s defenders to argue persuasively that the way in 
which the right is restricted—here, the right to marry—lies within the range of permissible 
liberal specifications of the abstract right. 
 35. See Richard D. Heideman, Legalizing Hate: The Significance of the Nuremberg Laws 
and the Post-War Nuremberg Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 5, 5 (2017). See also 
Ann Coulter (@AnnCoulter), TWITTER (Nov. 7, 2016, 10:42 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
anncoulter/status/795833821501460480?lang=en (“If only people with at least 4 grandparents 
born in America were voting, Trump would win in a 50-state landslide.”). 
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reasons to think that such a constitutionalism could not be stable over 
the medium to long run. Depending on how stringent the requirement of 
stability for a reasonable period is, this might show that illiberal 
constitutionalism is (or is not) possible. 
This Essay turns now to the second approach to illiberal 
constitutionalism, from the top, where the analogy is to federalism. A 
key characteristic of some forms of federalism is that citizens of a single 
nation enjoy different sets of liberal rights depending on where they 
happen to live. This is not to say that they enjoy different rights 
described at a reasonably high level of abstraction. So, again to use a 
stylized example, people who live in Rio de Janeiro have a right to 
freedom of expression, as do people who live in Brasilia. But the rights 
they have differ in their specifications. Importantly, there are alternative 
reasonable specifications of essentially all liberal rights, specifications 
compatible with the liberal premise that all people are equal in all 
respects relevant to governance.36 If one believes, as some do,37 that 
laws restricting the distribution of hate speech are compatible with that 
premise, if Brasilia has a law banning hate speech and Rio de Janeiro 
does not, people in Brasilia have a right to free speech that is different 
from the right that people in Rio de Janeiro do.38 To revert to the 
language already used in this Essay, as people in Rio de Janeiro see it, 
people in Brasilia are second-class citizens of Brazil because they have 
fewer rights than “Cariocas” do.39 
United States constitutional history provides a real-world example. 
Constitutional doctrine from the 1920s to the early 1960s held that first 
some, then most of the substantive guarantees of the first eight 
amendments—the Bill of Rights—were applicable to the states by 
                                                                                                                     
 36. There might be some rights, which might be described as absolute rights, as to which 
there are no alternative reasonable specifications. The main candidate would be the right not to 
be subjected to torture. The argument drawn from federalism that this Essay makes would not be 
affected by the existence of a relatively small number of such rights. 
 37. A shorthand defense of that belief: Many political systems that seem unarguably 
liberal have laws against hate speech, and such laws are defensible within liberal premises in the 
sense that the reasons for them, and in particular reasons drawn from ideas about promoting or 
maintaining social equality, are compatible with those premises even if, on balance, one thinks 
that the liberal reasons against such laws are stronger than the liberal reasons for them. For a 
recent liberal defense of some laws regulating hate speech, see JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN 
HATE SPEECH 3–4 (2012). 
 38. If the reader disagrees with the author about hate speech laws, there are a host of other 
examples—regulations of sexually explicit material or of demonstrations in public places—that 
could make this point. 
 39. “Carioca” is the word used to describe a resident of Rio de Janeiro. Carioca, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009).  
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operation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.40 But, 
until the late 1960s states could comply with the Constitution with 
varying specifications of the applicable protections. Palko v. 
Connecticut,41 for example, dealt with a statute authorizing the 
government to appeal from an acquittal in a criminal case where, the 
government claimed, the jury had received mistaken instructions about 
the applicable law.42 The defendant challenged the statute’s 
constitutionality, asserting that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.43 
That assertion rested on cases holding that the federal government could 
not appeal acquittals based upon a claim of mistaken jury instructions, 
because, the cases said, such appeals were barred by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.44 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Palko’s challenge, 
saying that the Due Process Clause, the relevant constitutional 
provision, guaranteed only those rights that were “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”45 Importantly, other states could interpret 
the double-jeopardy ban as prohibiting government appeals in criminal 
cases. As Justice John Marshall Harlan put it, under the Court’s so-
called “selective incorporation” doctrine, Bill of Rights guarantees were 
not applied to the states “jot-for-jot” as they were applied to the national 
government.46 
In federal systems, then, people in one location can enjoy different 
sets of specified liberal rights.47 Now consider all possible abstract 
liberal rights: Each can be specified in numerous ways. Some 
specifications provide greater protection than others, though all 
specifications are compatible with liberalism: hate speech laws or no 
hate speech laws, interpretation of equality provisions as ensuring only 
                                                                                                                     
 40. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949) (involving an unconstitutional 
search), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 
(1931) (involving free speech or free press). 
 41. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).  
 42. Id. at 320–21. 
 43. Id. at 321.  
 44. See id.  
 45. Id. at 325. 
 46. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Duncan, 
Justice Harlan criticized the Court for insisting on jot-for-jot incorporation, which, he accurately 
said, was inconsistent with the approach taken in Palko and its successors. Id.; see also Williams 
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explicitly contrasting jot-for-jot 
incorporation with Palko). 
 47. A comment on a draft of this Essay by Professor Gerald Torres pointed out that the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012) might provide another 
example of a class of citizens entitled, within subnational jurisdictions, to a less robust set of 
rights than citizens elsewhere. The Act provides that Indian tribes “exercising powers of self-
government” must respect a list of rights similar to but not as comprehensive as the national Bill 
of Rights. Id. § 1301. The example might be contentious because of questions about the relation 
between Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign governments and the U.S. government.   
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formal equality or as ensuring substantive equality, and the like. 
Further, we can probably array the different specifications of each right 
on a scale ranging from strong or “full” protection to weak protection. 
Suppose that one subnational jurisdiction chooses to specify all the 
liberal rights in ways that lie at the low end of each scale. It has laws 
against hate speech and laws against the dissemination of lies, it allows 
appeals of acquittals, and so on through the list of liberal rights. By 
assumption each of those specifications is consistent with the liberal 
premise of equality of all persons. For that reason, I find it difficult to 
conclude that this subnational jurisdiction is illiberal. Yet, when we 
look at the nation as a whole, we see a large number of people who 
enjoy a wider range of rights than those in the “low-end” jurisdiction. 
From the national perspective, one might say, as a first cut, that the 
people in the low-end jurisdiction are second-class citizens vis-à-vis 
those in the rest of the nation. If so, a federal system of this sort might 
be described as one in which not all citizens are treated as equals in 
respect of governance, and so as an illiberal constitutional system: 
illiberal because of the inequality, but constitutional because all citizens 
enjoy liberal rights at some level of specification.48 
The Essay now introduces some qualifications and complications. 
The first is reasonably obvious, but may not be that important for the 
overall inquiry. In the prior example, Hungarians of non-Hungarian 
ethnic origin are permanently confined to second-class citizenship but 
citizens of the low-end jurisdiction are not similarly confined because 
they can move elsewhere in the nation.49 If the possibility of exit is 
always an answer to the possibility of second-class citizenship, it may 
be quite difficult to find examples of illiberal systems. People who are 
not ethnic Hungarians can “self-deport” (rather than be ethnically 
cleansed through force).50 If people self-deport because they do not like 
the low level of rights they have, even though rights at that level are 
consistent with liberal premises, we may end up with a state in which 
the vast majority of people are full, first-class citizens and the second-
class citizens have decided that, all things considered, having that status 
                                                                                                                     
 48. To forestall the objection that the “low end” rights affect only local matters and so do 
not disadvantage the citizens of the low-end jurisdiction vis-à-vis those in high-end ones, 
consider the example of hate speech regulation applicable to some matters on the national policy 
agenda. Citizens in the high-end jurisdiction may say some things that citizens in the low-end 
one cannot, and as a result might have greater influence on shaping national policy. For 
additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 49–52. 
 49. On standard accounts of federalism, this “exit” option places some constraints on each 
subnational jurisdiction’s choices. In particular, the availability of high-end jurisdictions might 
induce jurisdictions initially at the low end to adopt more protective specifications of liberal 
rights. 
 50. An illiberal system’s attempt to prevent exit may exacerbate tensions between the 
community of second-class citizens and the first-class ones, thereby undermining stability. 
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is better than moving elsewhere. That might be a stable illiberal 
constitutional system.51 This seems to be the most likely form of stable 
illiberal constitutionalism. 
A second qualification is that people in the low-end jurisdiction are 
not second-class citizens vis-à-vis each other. Everyone within that 
jurisdiction has the same low level of rights.52 What, though, of a single 
polity within which some citizens have their liberal rights specified at a 
high level and others have them specified at a lower level (though, 
again, at a level that is defensible within liberalism)? Suppose, for 
example, that in my stylized Hungary, acquittals of ethnic Hungarians 
cannot be appealed because of double jeopardy concerns but acquittals 
of ethnic Poles can be appealed (and both groups otherwise have 
identical rights in criminal proceedings). This is almost by definition 
illiberal because of the discrimination. But, at least at present, I am 
inclined to think that it is constitutionalist because the content of the 
low-level rule allowing appeals is consistent with constitutionalism.  
Again in a stylized version, Quebec provides a more consequential 
example. In a province with a substantial majority of Francophones, 
English is a disfavored language.53 Signs must be predominantly in 
French, and education policy is structured to channel children into 
Francophone schools.54 The purpose and effect of these policies is to 
show that Quebec has a preferred class of citizens, the Francophones, 
and another, one might say second, class of citizens, the Anglophones. 
As in the Hungarian “example” of criminal procedure rights, in this 
example everyone has the same set of liberal rights within a wide range, 
but not with respect to rights that have some relation to maintaining 
Quebec’s Francophone identity. Importantly, Anglophones participate 
fully in the province’s local politics on a one-person, one-vote basis. 
And they have full free speech rights. They can, for example, advocate 
for abandoning the province’s pro-Francophone policies, though of 
course they are (or would be, if they bothered to try) predictably 
outvoted when questions of provincial identity are put to a vote. 
Should we treat this version of Quebec as an illiberal system because 
of its language policy? Note that the language policy is not a shortfall, 
because the province rejects equality among citizens without regard to 
their language as a matter of principle. And it is not an isolated 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Cf. Anna Stilz, Guestworkers and Second-Class Citizenship, 29 POL’Y & SOC’Y 295 
(2010) (arguing that some restrictions on the rights of guestworkers may be morally 
permissible). 
 52. As the preceding paragraph dealing with exit suggests, they might be said to have 
chosen to have their rights specified at a low level.  
 53. See Rebelling Against Quebec’s ‘Language Police,’ BBC: NEWS (May 7, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22408248.  
 54. See id.  
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aberration or unfortunate deviation from liberal equality that persists 
because of historical accident. Rather, the language policy is 
constitutive of Quebec’s political identity. Yet, because Anglophones 
have the opportunity to persuade their co-citizens that the language 
policy should be abandoned, and there is nothing in the constitutional 
structure that precludes them from succeeding, I am inclined to think 
that the province is not illiberal: It is open to changing even its 
constitutive identity through political mechanisms fully compatible with 
liberalism, and the fact that change is unlikely results from the 
preferences of Francophone voters, which might change. 
A final case is more difficult. Here the national ethnic identity is 
protected by the constitution. That is, under the constitution as it 
presently exists, the government is required to take steps to sustain the 
national identity. So, for example, the Preamble to Hungary’s 2011 
Constitution reads: “We commit ourselves to cherishing and preserving 
our heritage, our unique language, the Hungarian culture . . . . We 
honour the achievements of our historical constitution and we honour 
the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of 
Hungary’s statehood and the unity of the nation.”55 The constitution 
does have provisions dealing with amendment, but, to ensure that the 
case remains a difficult one, assume that the constitutional provisions 
dealing with national identity are understood, within the nation’s legal 
culture, to be part of the constitution’s “basic structure,” and for that 
reason cannot be amended within the constitution’s own framework.56 
Assume, in addition, that Hungary’s free speech guarantee is 
interpreted as making it permissible––and perhaps even required, in 
light of the phrase “preserve and nurture”—to prohibit advocacy of 
policies that have a tendency to undermine the Hungarian character of 
the state. Liberal constitutional accounts of free speech have converged 
on the conclusion that the free speech principle makes it impermissible 
to prohibit speech simply because it has a bad tendency.57 So, the “bad 
tendency” provision is not within the range of permissible specifications 
of the liberal right—it is illiberal. Those who are not ethnic Hungarians 
are irremediably relegated to second-class status by the nation’s 
                                                                                                                     
 55. MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY] Apr. 25, 
2011, pmbl. The reference to the “Holy Crown” is, within Hungarian culture, an important 
pointer to the way in which the Preamble describes Hungarian ethnicity as constitutive of 
national identity. 
 56. See generally YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: 
THE LIMITS OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017) (explaining the recent comprehensive treatment of 
unamendable constitutional provisions). 
 57. In my view (which is probably an outlier among scholars), that convergence still 
leaves room for invoking a “bad tendency” test where a polity is a highly contentious one, with 
peace among contending factions quite fragile. But, for purposes of this Essay, assume that the 
stylized Hungary is not such a polity. 
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constitutive commitments. But, again, if we assume that they receive 
rule-of-law and thin constitutional protections in all other domains, then 
the Hungary described here may be an illiberal constitutionalist system. 
To this point this Essay has described several ways in which an 
illiberal constitutionalism might have first- and second-class citizens. 
The next question is whether these illiberal constitutionalist systems can 
be stable enough. The problem here arises once again from porosity, but 
it takes a somewhat different form than it did earlier because the core 
illiberalism implicates limitations on freedom of expression. We can 
assume that Hungary’s second-class citizens would prefer that the 
nation abandon its constitutive commitment to Hungarian ethnicity. But, 
on these assumptions, they cannot express that preference because of 
the laws restricting freedom of expression; indeed those laws are what 
make the system illiberal. But, what about ethnic Hungarians who are, 
so to speak, cosmopolitans? They reject in principle the proposition that 
any nation can permissibly have a constitutive commitment to 
ethnonationalism. Cosmopolitans too are going to be subject to 
punishment for advocating cosmopolitanism, because that advocacy has 
the prohibited bad tendency. The analogy to the problem for illiberal 
constitutionalism illustrated by Loving v. Virginia should be clear.58 The 
system’s illiberalism cannot be contained with the group of second-class 
citizens. At some point, the regime may have to revert to mere rule-of-
law constitutionalism for all of its opponents to defend, in the regime’s 
eyes, the nation’s constitutive identity. Yet, the line between an illiberal 
constitutionalism that subjects second-class citizens and the regime’s 
opponents to the rule of law and thin constitutionalism, and 
authoritarianism seems to be thin indeed.59 Still, if the line, though thin, 
can be drawn, perhaps a system in which a regime’s supporters have 
liberal rights and its opponents have rule-of-law and thin constitutional 
protections might be constitutionalist. 
Another source of porosity is external. Illiberalism will meet with 
some opposition on the international scene.60 To continue with this 
stylized example, the Polish government is not going to be happy about 
the treatment of ethnic Poles in an ethno-nationalist Hungary. It will use 
the standard tools of international relations—sanctions, shaming, 
recruiting other nations into a coalition of opposition—to put pressure 
                                                                                                                     
 58. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.  
 59. Another source of instability might flow from the psychology of leadership in illiberal 
regimes. “Illiberal” leaders might well have authoritarian impulses, and, frustrated when they 
come close to the line between illiberal constitutionalism and authoritarianism, may simply 
choose to breach the line. 
 60. “Some” opposition, but not universal opposition. Authoritarian regimes will not 
oppose illiberal ones because of their illiberalism, though of course they may oppose them for 
other reasons. And, leaders of illiberal regimes will almost certainly see each other as worthy of 
support. 
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on Hungary. These external pressures might push the illiberal regime 
away from its illiberalism, perhaps toward liberalism, but perhaps 
toward authoritarianism. Still, the target nation might be able to resist 
those pressures. And perhaps the illiberal nation is so insignificant in 
international terms that no outsiders care enough to do anything about 
the nation’s departures from liberal constitutionalism. So, though 
external pressure might undermine an illiberal constitutionalist regime, 
that regime might persist for long enough to be counted as stable.  
This Essay concludes by returning to the scenario offered earlier of a 
society divided among three groups, each of which has greater access 
than the others to different resources important for governance: votes, 
local wealth, and wealth from the diaspora. At the time of its creation, 
the illiberal constitution’s allocation of power works effectively to 
preserve peace among the groups. The difficulty, if it is one, is that all 
three sets of resources can change (another example of porosity). Rates 
of population growth among the groups may vary; locally generated 
wealth and inputs from the diaspora may increase or decrease. In some 
configurations these changes may revive the tensions that the 
constitution initially resolved. So, for example, the constitution gives 
less power to the group with the largest numbers than would a “one 
person, one vote” system. If that group’s population grows quite a bit 
more quickly than the populations in the other groups, the illiberal 
allocation of voting power may come to seem increasingly unfair—and 
particularly so if the resources the other groups brought to the table 
decrease. A large drop in contributions from the diaspora might make it 
seem increasingly unfair that the third group has political power equal 
to that of the first and second. We can readily imagine other 
configurations with similar destabilizing effects.  
Which components of the “peace pact” constitution change, and 
even whether any do, is of course an empirical question. So is whether 
the array of forces—again, votes and material resources generated 
locally and from the diaspora—changes in a way that leads some 
citizens to rethink the constitutional arrangements. And, finally, so is 
whether citizens will conclude that undoing the peace-pact constitution 
in light of these changes is worth the risk that violent conflict will 
revive. If the contingencies happen to fall out in the right way, the 
illiberal constitution would be stable enough. Once again, then, this 
Essay concludes that a stable-enough illiberal constitutionalism is 
possible, though once again the odds are against it. 
This Essay is a first foray into what has proven to be quite difficult 
terrain for me, and I expect to revise my thinking as I explore other 
facets of illiberal constitutionalism. Consistent with the question mark 
in this Essay’s title, the conclusion is quite tentative: At present it seems 
that the form of illiberal constitutionalism in which one group of 
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citizens receives substantial liberal rights, and another receives rule-of-
law and thin constitutional protection against arbitrary treatment but 
nothing more, is a theoretically available possibility. And, under some 
conditions such an illiberal constitutionalism might be at least as stable 
as liberal constitutionalist systems have shown themselves to be. 
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